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ABSTRACT—In his 1984 landmark article, Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, Professor Martin H.
Redish advanced the thesis that the abstention doctrines constituted a
violation of separation of powers. Redish’s theory was, and is,
controversial. The suggestion that an embedded area of federal courts law
is unconstitutional is, at the least, highly provocative. It is also ultimately
unpersuasive. There are too many justifications underlying the legitimacy
of abstention to support the conclusion that it violates the Constitution. Yet,
as this Essay demonstrates, one does not have to be persuaded by Redish’s
constitutional conclusion to appreciate the landmark significance of his
project. Prior to Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, the virtues of judicial restraint had been reflexively
characterized as judicial deference to the decisions of political actors.
Professor Redish, however, replaced this understanding with the more
nuanced view that judicial restraint might also mean courts performing the
tasks to which they were assigned. In so doing, Redish fundamentally
recast the debate as to the proper understanding of the role and obligations
of the federal judiciary and the meaning of judicial activism and judicial
restraint.
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INTRODUCTION
Abstention allows federal courts to avoid deciding disputes affecting
the states and state law, or at least to delay hearing such disputes until the
matters have been heard by the state courts. In so doing, abstention
accomplishes a number of goals. It lessens the possibility that federal
courts will needlessly decide constitutional issues. It minimizes federal
court friction with state courts, state executives, and state legislatures. It
protects against unnecessary federal court intrusion into sensitive matters of
state policy. For these reasons, the abstention doctrines have been generally
considered models of judicial restraint.
Professor Martin H. Redish, however, powerfully challenged this view
of abstention. In Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function,1 Redish contended that the abstention doctrines were not
exercises of judicial restraint and humility; they were examples of judicial
hubris. Abstention was not an instance of the federal judiciary’s deferring
to the other branches; it was an example of the federal courts rejecting the
duly imposed obligations that the other branches had placed upon them.2
Abstention, Redish concluded, was a violation of the separation of powers.3
Redish’s theory was, and is, controversial. The suggestion that an
embedded area of federal courts law is not only ill-advised but actually
illegal is, at the least, a dramatic departure from a settled understanding.
Redish’s theory, moreover, is ultimately not convincing. There are too
many strong justifications underlying the legitimacy of abstention to
support the conclusion that it violates the Constitution.

1
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
2
See id. at 77.
3
See id.
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Yet, one does not have to be persuaded by Redish’s constitutional
conclusion to appreciate the landmark significance of his project. And that
is the point that I intend to develop in this Essay. Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function rightly holds status as one
of the most important and transformative accounts of the law of federal
courts that has yet been written. But as I will argue, Redish’s article holds
this status not because it is correct but because it changed the way that the
meaning of judicial restraint was conceptualized.
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the abstention doctrines and the
nature of Redish’s attack upon them. Part II discusses the academic
reaction to Redish’s thesis, including the arguments as to why Redish’s
bottom line that the abstention doctrines violate separation of powers has
not proved convincing. Part III demonstrates why, nevertheless, Redish’s
thesis was, and is, so fundamental to the proper understanding of the role
and obligations of the federal judiciary and to the meaning of judicial
activism.
I.

THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES

A. Background
The term “abstention” refers to a set of judicially created doctrines
under which federal courts may choose to decline to exercise their
jurisdiction over cases otherwise appropriately before them.4 Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,5 decided in 1941, is generally
considered the first major case on the subject, although there were some
antecedents.6 The Pullman Court held—creating what has become known
as Pullman abstention—that a federal court should abstain when state law
is unclear and a state court decision may make federal adjudication of a
constitutional issue unnecessary.7
Abstention soon proved to be a growth industry, and by the time
Redish wrote Abstention and Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court had
created no fewer than five separate abstention doctrines. Each abstention
doctrine, like Pullman, became known by the Supreme Court decision in
which the particular doctrine was announced. Burford abstention (1943)
held that federal courts should abstain in deference to complex state
administrative procedures.8 Thibodaux abstention (1959) decided that
4

Id. at 71; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 783 (5th ed. 2007).
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
6
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1059 n.1 (6th ed. 2009); see also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584, 605
(1858) (holding that federal courts did not have jurisdiction over domestic relations matters such as
alimony and divorce).
7
See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
8
See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943).
5
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federal courts should abstain if state law is uncertain and important state
interests such as eminent domain are at issue.9 Younger abstention (1971),
undoubtedly the most important of the abstention doctrines, announced that
federal courts must abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.10 Colorado River
abstention (1976) concluded that abstention could be required in deference
to ongoing, parallel state proceedings in certain circumstances.11
After Colorado River, the burgeoning of abstention subsided. Still, in
1984, coincidentally the same year that Redish wrote Abstention and
Separation of Powers, the Court in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.12 appeared
once more to dramatically expand abstention, this time by flirting with the
idea of applying Younger abstention to all civil litigation. But Pennzoil was
quickly limited to its particular circumstances,13 and one of the remarkable
things about abstention is how stable the doctrine has been for over thirty
years.
B. Standard Criticisms of Abstention
Abstention is not hard to criticize, and it may be useful to note some of
the other commonly noted objections to it before reaching Redish’s specific
critique. One problem with abstention should already be obvious. Five
separate strains of abstention have made the area inordinately convoluted,
and even the Court itself at times seems unable to keep the lines of
demarcation between the various doctrines analytically clear.14 Second, the
abstention doctrines often require federal courts to refuse to exercise
jurisdiction in circumstances when access to the federal courts is most
needed.15 Both diversity and federal question jurisdiction are justified in
large part on the notion that a federal forum may be necessary to avoid
state court bias.16 Abstention, however, is based in part on the assertion that

See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27‒30 (1959).
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
11
See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
12
481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (applying Younger to a suit between two private parties).
13
See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367‒68 (1989)
(holding that Younger does not apply to all pending civil actions). As Professor Chemerinsky explains,
Pennzoil may be limited to cases between private parties that involve judicial enforcement of court
orders. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 848.
14
See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814 (grouping Burford and
Thibodaux abstention into a single category and noting that “[a]bstention is also appropriate where there
have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar”); see also, e.g., Karakas v.
McKeown, 783 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (noting that there is disagreement in the
cases and in commentary as to the number and nature of the abstention doctrines).
15
See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 538–43 (1989).
16
Cf. id. at 541 (discussing how avoiding possible state court bias is “[t]he premise of diversity
jurisdiction”).
9

10
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principles of comity and federalism demand deference to state courts when
the state has a particularly strong interest in a dispute’s outcome.17 Yet, as
Professor Barry Friedman notes, “Where the state’s interest in the outcome
of the dispute is very high . . . so is the potential for state court bias against
the federal claimant . . . .”18 The “perverse” result of all this is that “the
Court requires abstention in those cases where bias against federal claims is
most likely.”19
Third, applications of the doctrines often lead to nightmares in judicial
administration. Under Pullman abstention, for example, the federal court is
supposed to retain jurisdiction over the case while the ambiguous state law
question is sent to the state courts for resolution. The case is then to be sent
back to the federal court for final resolution. But lengthy delays in such a
system are inevitable as cases are bounced back and forth from federal to
state court. The litigation in Thibodaux, for example, took seven years to
complete;20 the litigation in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners,21 discussed below, took over nine.22
Fourth, the maneuvering between court systems also creates problems
in the application of the law of res judicata. The adjudication of the state
law issue by the state court will often include the litigation of facts or legal
issues that are germane to the federal issues in the case. Should the federal
court treat the issues resolved by the state court as res judicata? The Court
in the England case, noted above, held that res judicata did not apply as
long as the party seeking federal jurisdiction explicitly reserved its right to
litigate the federal issues before the federal court.23 But questions as to
whether a litigant has adequately preserved its rights to return to federal
court can lead to their own set of litigable issues.24 Moreover, even when
those issues are resolved, the requirement of having the litigant explicitly
reserve its right to return to federal court invariably leads to an intractable
practical concern for the litigant. The reservation requirement effectively
demands that the litigant stand before a state court judge and state in not so
many words, “I am here to litigate the state issue only and will reserve my
right to litigate the federal issue in federal court because I do not trust the
state courts to appropriately decide this issue.” This is not, I would suggest,

17

See id. at 542.
Id. at 542–43.
19
Id. at 543.
20
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 812 n.17.
21
375 U.S. 411 (1964).
22
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 812 n.17.
23
See England, 375 U.S. at 419.
24
See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (discussing
constitutional issues implicated by reservation of federal questions under England).
18
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generally an effective way for a lawyer to build rapport with a state court
judge.25
Fifth, the legal wrangling over abstention leads to yet another set of
awkward litigation postures. Consider a case in which the litigant raises a
constitutional challenge to a newly enacted state law. The incentive of the
state defendant, should the defendant want the court to abstain, is to argue
that the state law is ambiguous, a strategy that is not the best should the
state later decide that it wants to prosecute the federal court plaintiff under
that law. The federal plaintiff meanwhile must simultaneously undermine
one of its own potential defenses to a later state court action by arguing, to
avoid federal court abstention, that the law actually is clear.
Sixth, abstention is inconsistent with the Court’s own rhetoric. In
Cohens v. Virgina,26 for example, Chief Justice John Marshall stated, “We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given.”27 At other times, the Court has
described the exercise of jurisdiction as a “duty”28 and declared that federal
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the
jurisdiction given them.”29 In stark contrast to these assertions, however,
abstention is a vehicle in which federal courts, by definition, “decline the
exercise of jurisdiction” and do not meet their “duties” and “unflagging
obligations.”
Finally, although this is less a criticism of the viability of abstention
than it is of the case law underlying the doctrines, abstention cases include
some of the most disingenuous in Supreme Court history.30 Consider the
juxtaposition of Younger v. Harris31 and Mitchum v. Foster.32 In Younger,
as mentioned above, the Court crafted a judge-made rule that a federal
court should not enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding absent
extraordinary circumstances. In so holding, the Court declined to rely on an
existing federal statute, the Anti-Injunction Act,33 although that provision
25

There is of course no guarantee that a state court will even agree to hear the state law issue in
these circumstances. See Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1975) (holding
that a federal court should dismiss the case without prejudice when the state court refuses to allow the
federal litigant to reserve its federal issues for the federal forum).
26
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
27
Id. at 404.
28
Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909).
29
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
30
I recognize the enormity of this claim given that Court disingenuousness is not exactly a rare
phenomenon. See, e.g., ___ v. ____, __ U.S. __ ( ) (the reader should feel free to insert her own case
citation).
31
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
32
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
33
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006) (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”).
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explicitly maintained that a federal court should not enjoin state
proceedings unless expressly authorized by Congress.34 As the Younger
Court stated:
Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under
equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to
consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state
court proceedings “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress” would
in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case.35

One year after Younger, the Court in Mitchum v. Foster decided the
question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided an “expressly authorized”
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Despite the fact that § 1983 has no
express language indicating that the statute provides an exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act,36 the Court ruled that it created such an exception
anyway because the policies underlying § 1983 supported having the
availability of federal injunctive relief.37 In so doing, the Court effectively
created what can only be termed an “implied express exception,” heretofore
a linguistic impossibility. Moreover, although Younger had explicitly stated
that it was not addressing the Anti-Injunction Act issue, the Mitchum Court
somehow held that Younger actually stood as direct authority for the
proposition that § 1983 was an expressly authorized exception to the Act.38
It gets better. As noted above, the Mitchum Court based its ruling in
large part on the policy concern that § 1983 was designed specifically to
allow federal courts to serve as protection for the individual against state
power. As the Mitchum Court stated:
34

See id.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
36
The relevant text of § 1983 is as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
37
See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242‒43.
38
See id. at 231 (“While the Court in Younger and its companion cases expressly disavowed
deciding the question now before us—whether § 1983 comes within the ‘expressly authorized’
exception of the anti-injunction statute—it is evident that our decisions in those cases cannot be
disregarded in deciding this question. In the first place, if § 1983 is not within the statutory exception,
then the anti-injunction statute would have absolutely barred the injunction issued in Younger, as the
appellant in that case argued, and there would have been no occasion whatever for the Court to decide
that case upon the ‘policy’ ground of ‘Our Federalism.’ Secondly, if § 1983 is not within the ‘expressly
authorized’ exception of the anti-injunction statute, then we must overrule Younger and its companion
cases insofar as they recognized the permissibility of injunctive relief against pending criminal
prosecutions in certain limited and exceptional circumstances. For, under the doctrine of Atlantic Coast
Line, the anti-injunction statute would, in a § 1983 case, then be an ‘absolute prohibition’ against
federal equity intervention in a pending state criminal or civil proceeding—under any circumstances
whatever.” (citation omitted)).
35
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This legislative history [of § 1983] makes evident that Congress clearly
conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the
Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was
concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized
that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those
rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts.
. . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
“whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.” In carrying out that
purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue
injunctions . . . . [T]his Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief
against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to
prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional
rights.39

Nevertheless, despite the eloquence and power of this language,
Mitchum turned out to be no more than a mirage. Mitchum involved an
effort by a federal litigant to enjoin a state law civil nuisance action brought
by the state to shut down an adult bookstore.40 Because the federal lawsuit
in Mitchum was an attempt to enjoin a state civil action, the case was
therefore initially distinguishable from Younger, which had held only that
federal courts could not enjoin state criminal actions and did not resolve
whether federal courts were similarly barred from enjoining state civil
enforcement actions.41 Mitchum, in turn, decided only the Anti-Injunction
Act question, again leaving open the question of whether Younger should
extend to state civil enforcement actions.42 The door quickly closed. Three
years after Mitchum, the Court in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.43 held that
Younger barred the federal courts from enjoining a state law civil nuisance
action brought to shut down an adult establishment, the exact same fact
pattern as in Mitchum.44 According to Huffman, Younger principles applied
to federal actions to enjoin state civil enforcement proceedings brought “in
aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.”45 The victory for the federal
litigant in Mitchum, in short, had been completely Pyrrhic and the opinion’s
language setting forth the compelling reasons why § 1983 plaintiffs needed
access to the federal courts completely hollow. It may be, as the Mitchum
Court explained, “that federal injunctive relief against a state court
proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great,

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
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Id. at 242 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
See id. at 227.
See id. at 230.
See id. at 242‒43.
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
See id. at 595–99, 611‒13.
Id. at 604.
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immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional rights,”46 but
that “essentiality” was not sufficient to overcome judge-made Younger
abstention.
Equally important, for our purposes, the Younger–Mitchum–Huffman
trilogy also sent a clear message. The Court would not allow the federal
courts to be constrained from issuing § 1983-based injunctions by the
application of a federal statute (the Anti-Injunction Act), but it would
prohibit federal courts from issuing § 1983-based injunctions against state
proceedings by the application of its own judge-made doctrines. As Redish
stated, “It is difficult to imagine a starker illustration of judicial usurpation
of legislative authority.”47
C. Redish’s Critique of Abstention
The Court’s disregard of congressional directives in favor of marching
to its own drummer was, of course, the central theme in Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function. Redish’s
thesis was as simple as it was elegant: When federal courts abstain from
exercising the jurisdiction vested in them by Congress, and when they
abstain from enforcing federally enacted civil rights statutes, they are
engaging in illegitimate judicial lawmaking, effectively violating
constitutional guarantees of separation of powers.48 As he explained:
Presumably no one would deny that a federal court cannot legitimately
invalidate a federal statute solely because of its unwise policies, or because it
would make judges work harder than they believe they should, or because the
judges themselves would not have enacted such legislation. Such behavior by
the judiciary would amount to a blatant—and indefensible—usurpation of
legislative authority. . . . Yet, in a sense, the abstention doctrines amount to
such usurpation.49

Having thus articulated his thesis, Redish then proceeded to defend it
against anticipated objections. Three of Redish’s defenses to his thesis are
especially notable50: he argues that (1) abstention is not justified by an
implied delegation by Congress to the judiciary, (2) abstention is not
supported by principles of equity, and (3) abstention is not necessary to
serve as a safety valve against the potentially disastrous results that might
occur if the federal courts did not refrain from exercising their jurisdiction
in certain circumstances. Each of these contentions will be discussed in
turn.
46

Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
Redish, supra note 1, at 88.
48
See id. at 71, 114–15.
49
Id. at 72.
50
Redish actually discusses four anticipated objections to his work: the three discussed below and
an additional objection relating only to his attack on Pullman abstention—specifically, that the exercise
of Pullman abstention only delays and does not defeat federal jurisdiction. See id. at 90.
47

889

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Implied Delegation. The “implied delegation” defense of abstention
posits that Congress, in its governing statutes, intended to give the federal
courts the authority to modify or limit the exercise of its jurisdiction to
avoid “friction within the federal system.”51 To Redish, this justification
was unpersuasive for a number of reasons. To begin with, Redish argued,
Congress itself had explicitly limited the exercise of federal jurisdiction in
a series of statutes indicating that it had chosen to specifically legislate on
the subject rather than broadly delegate.52 And while Redish conceded that
“[i]t is true that the existence of this program of statutorily dictated
abstention does not necessarily preclude Congress from vesting in the
federal judiciary the authority to extend abstention beyond these legislative
limitations,” he nevertheless concluded that “it does establish that federal
court abstention is not an area in which Congress has traditionally deferred
to judicial discretion.”53
Moreover, Redish continued, the implied delegation argument was
seriously flawed for the basic reason that there was no evidentiary support
for the proposition that Congress intended to allocate such discretion.54 As
he wrote:
No supporter of partial abstention has pointed to anything approaching hard
evidence in the legislative history of either the original enactment or the more
recent reenactments of the substantive and jurisdictional civil rights statutes
which suggests that Congress intended that the federal courts possess
authority to modify or limit otherwise unlimited legislation.55

Redish’s response to the implied delegation argument also addressed
the contention that even if Congress may not have originally intended to
delegate the authority to the federal courts to abstain, it had nevertheless
acquiesced in the practice by not overturning the abstention doctrines by
statutory directive. Again, Redish was not persuaded. To Redish, reliance
on Congress’s failure to overturn a judge-made doctrine as a rationale for
keeping that doctrine in place “effectively condones through legislative
inertia what was initially an improper and unauthorized judicial usurpation
of legislative authority.”56
Equity. The abstention doctrines, and most particularly Younger, are
often defended based upon traditional notions of equity.57 The Younger
Court, for example, directly relied on traditional equitable principles in
51

Id. at 80.
See id. at 81. These statutory limitations include such provisions as the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C § 2283 (2006), and the Tax Injunction Act, id. § 1341.
53
Redish, supra note 1, at 81.
54
See id.
55
Id. at 81‒82.
56
Id. at 82.
57
Equity was also cited as a justification for abstention in the Pullman decision. See R.R. Comm’n
of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941).
52
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holding that a federal court should not enjoin an ongoing criminal
proceeding. As Younger explained, traditional equity rules required that a
court should not issue an injunction when there was an available adequate
remedy at law.58 Based on this principle, the Younger Court reasoned that a
federal court should not enjoin an ongoing state court prosecution because
the state court defendant had an adequate remedy available in the form of
his ability to raise his constitutional objections as a defense in the state
court action.59
Redish’s responses to the equity argument were particularly cogent.
He noted that the traditional notions of equity, upon which Younger relied,
came from the English system, which had a unitary composition,60 and not
from a federalism model that was divided into two distinct judicial
structures. Traditional equitable principles regarding the availability of an
adequate remedy at law as a bar to issuing an injunction, Redish
maintained, meant the availability of that remedy in the same judicial
system (the federal courts) and not the possible availability of a remedy in
another judicial system (the state courts).61 Even more powerfully, Redish
took on the proposition at its core that the ability of a state defendant to
raise his constitutional defenses in state court constituted an adequate
remedy at law. As Redish noted, the position that state courts provided an
adequate remedy at law for the vindication of federal rights was completely
inconsistent with the basic premise underlying federal question jurisdiction
and substantive statutes like § 1983—specifically, that state courts were not
adequate protectors of federal rights.62
Safety Valve. Redish last addressed the contention that the abstention
doctrine might be justified under a “safety valve” rationale, meaning that
“the social and political results of an abolition of abstention would be so
disastrous that Congress could not possibly have contemplated them.”63
Reviewing each abstention doctrine, Redish found no such disastrous threat
to be imminent. Redish recognized, of course, that in the context of
Younger abstention, the possibility that state defendants raising a Fourth
Amendment claim would routinely “walk across the street to the federal
courthouse to seek an injunction of the state proceeding as a violation of
section 1983”64 could constitute a substantial disruption. But he argued that
58

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).
See id. at 49.
60
Redish, supra note 1, at 85.
61
See id. at 85‒86; see also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[I]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should . . . dismiss
a suit merely because a State court could entertain it.”).
62
See Redish, supra note 1, at 111; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961)
(asserting essentially the same rationale regarding § 1983—that the statute was enacted to “provide[] a
remedy where state law was inadequate”).
63
Redish, supra note 1, at 90.
64
Id. at 92.
59
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the threat was considerably overstated because no deprivation of the
defendant’s rights would occur until after a conviction.65 And although
Redish conceded that the availability of the federal courts to enjoin state
courts based upon other alleged constitutional violations could potentially
be disruptive, he contended that any resulting friction was the result of the
congressional decision to provide federal court protection against potential
state deprivations of federal rights.66
II. CRITIQUING REDISH’S CRITIQUE
Redish’s assertion that the abstention doctrines were unconstitutional
and his defense of this position against possible counterarguments was
brilliant, creative, and prescient. It did not, however, prove to be
persuasive. The Supreme Court, as far as I am aware, has never directly
engaged the theory that abstention constitutes a constitutional violation of
separation of powers,67 and although Redish’s thesis provoked considerable
discussion from leading federal courts scholars, the academic response has
been generally one of disagreement.68
In Jurisdiction and Discretion,69 for example, Professor David Shapiro
directly questioned Redish’s characterization of the abstention doctrines as
judicial usurpation of the legislative process.70 To Shapiro, abstention
doctrines that bestowed discretion in the federal courts for exercising
jurisdiction were nothing new and were fully consistent with other judicial
doctrines,71 common law history and traditions, and ideals of federalism

See id. at 92‒93 (“By its terms, section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief only if a federal right
has been violated.”).
66
See id. at 94.
67
But see A.T. v. Cnty. of Cook, 613 F. Supp. 775, 777 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“A nationally
renowned authority recently has argued forcefully that the Younger doctrine violates principles of
separation of powers in that the Court was substituting its policy judgments for those of Congress in
carving out exceptions to broad congressional grants of jurisdiction.” (citing Redish, supra note 1)).
68
One notable exception to the academic commentary opposing Redish’s position is Professor
Donald L. Doernberg, who, citing Chief Justice John Marshall, has characterized the Court’s failure to
exercise the jurisdiction afforded to it as “treason to the [C]onstitution.” Donald L. Doernberg, “You
Can Lead a Horse to Water . . .”: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow the Exercise of Original
Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 1002 (1989–90) (quoting Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). From the other side, Professor Calvin Massey has argued
that not only are the abstention doctrines constitutionally permissible, but also that some aspects of
abstention are constitutionally required. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits
of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811.
69
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
70
See id. at 544.
71
Among the examples Shapiro lists of other practices and doctrines that give federal courts
discretion over whether or not to exercise jurisdiction are justiciability, forum non conveniens,
exhaustion of remedies, and equitable discretion. See id. at 548–70. These are instances where, as
Professor Shapiro states regarding justiciability, there is “a penumbra within which the Court sees itself
as having discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction.” Id. at 554.
65
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and comity.72 Characterizing the law in the statutes and constitutional
provisions that formed the “charter” of federal jurisdiction to be “organic,”
Shapiro argued that the courts were in a better position to resolve how to
exercise jurisdiction under those measures because jurisdictional matters
“intimately affect the courts’ relations with each other as well as with the
other branches of government.”73 Thus, a grant of jurisdiction should be
“read as an authorization . . . to entertain an action but not as an inexorable
command.”74 Shapiro’s prescription was that jurisdictional statutes should
determine the amount of discretion the courts are afforded in making
jurisdictional decisions, and the courts should operate within that grant of
discretion to weigh principles of equitable discretion, federalism and
comity, separation of powers, and judicial administration against a
presumption of assertion of jurisdiction to make a final determination of
whether abstention is appropriate.75
Michael Wells, in the not so subtly titled Why Professor Redish Is
Wrong About Abstention,76 challenged Professor Redish’s institutional
objections to the abstention doctrines as being based upon a “faulty
premise.”77 Specifically, Professor Wells argued that § 1983, the statute that
Redish argued was most undermined by abstention, was never intended to
create such a broad cause of action in the first place.78 Section 1983 was
originally adopted by Congress to address the problem of the Southern
states’ failure to protect blacks from oppression by groups like the Ku Klux
Klan.79 It was not until 1960 that § 1983 became a broad vehicle by which
individuals could bring actions against the state for violations of their
federal rights.80 Therefore, according to Professor Wells, abstention is
merely a judge-made restriction on a judge-made expansion of federal
jurisdiction, and not a repudiation of congressional intent as Professor
Redish contended.81 Further, Professor Wells argued that both the judicial
expansion and restriction of jurisdiction are legitimate creations of federal
common law due to the presence of a strong federal interest in resolution of
the issue and Congress’s failure to act on the issue.82
Professor Ann Althouse, meanwhile, questioned Professor Redish’s
contention that Congress alone has authority to determine the jurisdiction
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

See id. at 545, 550‒52.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
See id. at 578‒79.
Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985).
Id. at 1097.
See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1103.
See id. at 1103–04.
See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1124‒25.
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of federal courts as being based on the false notion that jurisdictional
statutes are unambiguous and leave no room for judicial discretion.83 To
her, the jurisdictional statutes were not so clear. And because the statutes
were written in general terms, the abstention doctrines did not represent a
usurpation of congressional power, but rather a product of a Judicial
Branch “partnership with Congress” wherein “each institution performs
aspects of the jurisdictional law-making function that fall particularly
within its capacity.”84 Furthermore, Professor Althouse argued there was no
threat to democratic decisionmaking posed by the abstention doctrines
because Congress retained the ultimate power to overrule any abuse of
jurisdictional discretion though legislation.85
Finally, Professor Jack Beermann, although agreeing with Professor
Redish that Congress ought to decide the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
rejected, on other grounds, the conclusion that abstention violated the
separation of powers.86 First, Beermann pointed out a textual weakness in
the separation of powers argument in that the Constitution does not
explicitly allocate authority over jurisdiction.87 Second, Professor
Beermann challenged Professor Redish’s conception of the separation of
powers, suggesting that rather than having the branches conceived as only
possessing exclusive powers, there might be instances, jurisdiction being
one of them, where Congress and the judiciary enjoyed a shared power.88
As Beermann wrote, “The idea of assigning primary responsibility for the
exercise of certain powers to different branches does not foreclose the
possibility that the other branches were also intended to exercise those
powers to some degree.”89 Third, Beermann posited that abstention might
also be defended on grounds that it could be necessary for the Court’s own
self-preservation because it allowed the Court to insulate itself from the
backlash that could result if it were forced into making exceedingly
unpopular decisions.90
83

See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (1989–90) (“Judge-made doctrines qualify and accommodate statutes that are
written in general terms and that cannot anticipate the realities of litigation encountered by judges.”).
84
Id.
85
See id. at 1048–49. Professor Althouse suggested, however, that abstention would raise different
concerns if the Court were to continue to apply abstention after Congress explicitly outlawed the
practice. See id. at 1048.
86
See Jack M. Beermann, “Bad” Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A
Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1053, 1058 (1989–
90).
87
See id.
88
To be sure, Beermann offers his notion of shared powers only tentatively and does not claim he
fully endorses this position. See id. at 1065.
89
Id. at 1062.
90
See id. at 1065–66. For an example where the Court may have used a jurisdictional device—in
that case, standing—to avoid exactly this sort of backlash, see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17‒18 (2004), holding a noncustodial parent did not have standing to challenge
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For many of the same reasons raised by the scholars cited above, I also
find Redish’s arguments that abstention is unconstitutional to be
unconvincing. Furthermore, while I believe Redish did a remarkable job in
anticipating counterarguments to his thesis, he did not, to my mind, entirely
overcome those objections. His rejection of the implied delegation
argument, for example, too quickly dismissed the argument that Congress
has acquiesced in the Court’s abstention decisions by not overturning them.
To be sure, the rule that Congress’s failure to overturn the Court’s
interpretation of a statute means that Congress has acquiesced in that
interpretation is controversial.91 But the Court has accepted the rule of
legislative acquiescence in its statutory interpretation outside the abstention
context, and there is no reason why it should not be equally applied in
matters of jurisdiction.92 To the contrary, although it may be true that
legislative inaction may not always be an accurate guide to legislative
intent because of problems of inertia and crowded legislative agendas,93 the
fact is Congress has consistently demonstrated that it can and will act when
it believes the Court has too narrowly interpreted one of its jurisdictional
statutes.94
Redish’s attack on the Court’s use of equity as a justification for
abstention is equally incomplete. Although Redish’s point that Younger
the constitutionality of the use of the words “under God” in the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance at
his daughter’s school.
91
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[V]indication by congressional inaction is a canard.”).
92
See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283‒84 (1972) (refusing to overturn a previous Court
decision holding that baseball was exempt from antitrust laws).
93
See Redish, supra note 1, at 83 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22‒23 (1985)).
94
Congress’s decision to eliminate the jurisdictional amount requirement in the federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), for example, was in part a response to the problem that the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, had ruled that there was no statutory basis for public assistance
beneficiaries to sue in federal court for violations of their federal statutory rights to assistance benefits.
S. REP. NO. 96-827, at 14, 16‒17 (1980); see also Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600
(1979) (holding that a welfare recipient could not sue the state for purportedly not granting her relief
required by federal law because there was no statutory jurisdictional basis to maintain a claim);
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 679 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 102‒04 (1979) (statement of Michael Trister, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law). In
Chapman, the recipients had originally brought their action under § 1343, which allowed plaintiffs to
bring civil rights claims without satisfying any jurisdictional amount requirement, but the Court ruled
that their claim for relief under the federal statute was not a civil rights claim. See Chapman, 441 U.S.
at 621. One year after Chapman was decided, Congress eliminated the jurisdictional amount
requirement in the federal question jurisdiction statute (§ 1331), allowing claimants such as the
plaintiffs in Chapman to bring their federal statutory benefits claims as a federal question rather than as
a civil rights claim. Similarly, Congress passed § 1367, allowing federal question jurisdiction over
pendent parties in reaction to the Court’s decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989),
which held that § 1331 did not authorize pendent party jurisdiction. (Finley and the passage of § 1367,
of course, could not inform Redish’s analysis because both occurred after Redish wrote Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function.)
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misapplied the traditional equitable “adequate remedy at law” rule in
concluding that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal
proceeding is certainly cogent, the dismissal of this one equitable principle
as a ground for decision does not mean that others are not available. Redish
may be right that equity in England did not mean avoidance of friction
within a federal system because England did not have a federal structure,95
but that does not mean that equitable principles should not be expanded to
reflect such a concern.
Redish’s discussion of the safety valve rationale, in turn, also
significantly understates the problem with the disruption of state
proceedings that would occur without Younger’s prohibition against a
federal court enjoining state criminal proceedings. Redish is likely correct
that most of the attempts by state criminal defendants to enjoin state
proceedings would be unsuccessful, but the ultimate disposition of the
federal claim is not what is of concern. The greater disruption to the state
criminal process is that costs in both time and resources for the state to
have to defend against a federal injunctive action would be exorbitant,
particularly since in most cases there would be little cost to the state
defendant’s pursuing the federal injunctive claim.
The most devastating attack on Redish’s thesis, however, came from
one Martin H. Redish. In Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court
Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation
Problem, Professor Redish compared the utility of the theory that
abstention constitutes a violation of the separation of powers to that of
voting for Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential election.96 To the
Redish of Intersystemic Redundancy, there was none. No matter what the
“merits of [the separation of powers] argument, it is not one which the
Supreme Court has ever accepted.”97 For Redish, it was time to move on.98
III. REDISH’S LASTING CONTRIBUTION
But as Redish may be incorrect in Abstention, Separation of Powers,
and the Limits of the Judicial Function in asserting that the abstention
doctrines constitute a constitutional violation, so too is he incorrect in
Intersystemic Redundancy in minimizing the importance of his earlier
work. Professor Redish may not have prevailed in convincing the bench
and the academy as to the merits of his thesis, but he did prevail in
changing the prevailing conceptions of the meaning of judicial activism
and judicial restraint.

95

See Redish, supra note 1, at 89.
See Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero
Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1370 (2000).
97
Id.
98
See id.
96
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When Redish wrote Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits
of the Judicial Function in 1984, the lines as to what constitutes judicial
activism were predictively drawn. Those who believed that the federal
courts should be reluctant to interfere with the actions of the political
branches, when possible, were considered judicial conservatives who
favored judicial restraint.99 Those who contended that the federal courts
should be relatively uninhibited in exercising judicial power, even when
that exercise entailed overturning the actions of the political branch, were
characterized as activists.100
Of course, both terms were politically drawn and politically laden.
Commitment to judicial restraint was seen to be salutary, connoting a
respect for the rule of law and deference to the decisions of the elected
branches.101 The charge of judicial activism, in turn, was just that—an
accusatory charge that implied an illegitimate legal decision made in
pursuit of preferred results.102 But there was a nonpolitical, academic side to
this debate as well. Alexander Bickel’s highly influential book, The Least
Dangerous Branch, for example, characterized judicial efforts to avoid
politically laden controversies as exemplifying passive virtues.103
Support for federal court abstention clearly fell on the judicial-restraint
side of the ledger.104 The abstention doctrines were devices that allowed the

99
See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 561
(2010).
100
See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the
Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 625‒26 (2002) (reproducing a Nixon
quotation describing the former President’s opinions on judicial appointments, from Richard Nixon
Campaign Speech (Nov. 2, 1968), in 27 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 23, 1969, at 798); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 207 (1985); William P. Marshall,
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (2002)
(“[J]udicial activism is most often associated with judicial invalidation of decisions by elected
representatives.”).
101
See Siegel, supra note 99, at 558.
102
See id. at 564, 570; see also STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM 6‒7 (2009) (describing how Ronald Reagan, as a candidate, promised to appoint only judges
“who understand the danger of short-circuiting the electoral process and disenfranchising the people
through judicial activism” (quoting Ronald Reagan, Remarks During a White House Briefing for
United States Attorneys, in 21 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1276, 1278 (Oct. 21,
1985))); Gerhardt, supra note 100 (“[The Court should not be] superlegislators with a free hand to
impose their social and political viewpoints upon the American People.” (quoting Richard Nixon
Campaign Speech, supra note 100)).
103
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111–98 (2d ed. 1986). Bickel, I
should note, does not discuss abstention in The Least Dangerous Branch, focusing more on
justiciability doctrines.
104
See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (describing abstention as a
doctrine under which “the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their authority because
of ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary” (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 457 (1919), and Di
Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935))).
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federal courts to delay or avoid hearing challenges to government action.
An abstaining court would therefore not even be in a position to invalidate
the actions of the political branches.
Redish, however, by demonstrating that the doctrine of abstention
could be as easily characterized as an example of judicial activism as it
could one of judicial restraint, exposed the false dichotomy underlying the
restraint‒activism distinction.105 Courts that refused to become involved in
controversial matters could be equally criticized for activism as those who
willingly entered the fray. Courts that overturned the decisions of elected
officials could be characterized as acting with judicial restraint because
they adhered to Congress’s jurisdictional directives. Conversely, courts that
refrained from exercising their jurisdiction could be criticized for their
activism.106
In accomplishing this task, Redish also advanced another important
proposition—that the purpose of the federal courts was actually to decide
cases and not avoid them. By contending that the federal courts’ failure to
decide cases properly before them constituted a constitutional violation,
Redish powerfully showed that the activism charge leveled against the
federal courts was profoundly off the mark. How was it activism for the
federal courts to do what both the Constitution and Congress required them
to do?
This is not to say, of course, that immediately after the publication of
Redish’s work, political charges of judicial activism aimed at federal courts
exercising their jurisdiction faded from the scene. Needless to say, these
charges continue to abound and flourish even though, as Neil Siegel
documents, the analytic basis of those charges has become less clear.107 But
Redish did change the terms of the academic debate. After Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, the virtue of
judicial restraint could no longer be measured on the basis of whether a
court refused to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly before it.
CONCLUSION
In Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, Martin H. Redish set forth the dramatic thesis that the Court’s

105
Professor Althouse contends that the recognition of “[t]his basic paradox of jurisdiction—that
restraint is a form of activism and activism a form of restraint—dates back at least to Marbury v.
Madison.” Althouse, supra note 83, at 1038–39. Perhaps so. But Redish gave this point salience in the
contemporary debate.
106
As Professor Siegel documents, current political battles over constitutional interpretation reflect
these changing conceptions. No longer do political conservatives consistently claim that deference to
the decisions of political branches is judicial restraint. They now, in some circumstances, contend that a
judge is an activist if she refuses to strike down popularly passed legislation. See Siegel, supra note 99,
at 570 (citing Kirk Victor, Court’s in Session, NAT’L J., May 23, 2009, at 37, 37).
107
See id. at 588.
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judge-made abstention doctrines violated constitutional norms of separation
of powers. Redish’s article was brilliant, creative, and prescient. It was also
wrong. The constitutionality of the abstention doctrines can be justified on
numerous grounds, and although the application of the doctrines may
sometimes be problematic, the goals of comity and federalism that they are
designed to serve are laudable.
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, nevertheless, was and continues to be a critically important work
in the law of federal courts. In the end, the article may not have changed
the bottom line in the calculation of whether the abstention doctrines are
constitutional. But through this work, Professor Redish did change the
manner in which the “virtue” of judicial restraint was conceptualized—
replacing the reflexive vision that insisted judicial interference with the
decisions of political actors was activism with the more nuanced view that
judicial restraint might also mean courts performing the tasks to which they
were assigned. And for that, federal courts scholars owe him an enduring
debt of gratitude.
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